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Abstract—The recent decrease in battery manufacturing costs
stimulates the market participation of utility-scale battery energy
storage systems (BESSs). However, battery degradation remains
a major concern for BESS owners while determining their
BESS investment and operation strategies. This paper studies
the impact of battery degradation on BESS’s operation and
revenue/cost in real-time energy, reserve, and pay as performance
regulation markets. Comparative case studies are performed on
two optimization frameworks which model the participation of a
price-maker BESS in energy and ancillary services markets with
and without considering battery degradation cost. A synthetic
test system built upon real-world data is adopted in the case
studies. Analyses reveal that degradation cost plays an important
role in the scheduling of BESSs and should not be neglected.
Several potential enhancements to the optimization frameworks
are discussed based on the performed analyses.
Index Terms—Battery energy storage system (BESS), battery
degradation cost, price-maker, case study, electricity markets
I. INTRODUCTION
The grid integration of battery energy storage systems
(BESSs) is expanding rapidly, thanks to the BESS’s desirable
characteristics of being a fast, efficient, and flexible generating
resource with the capability of multiple services provision
[1]. BESSs are capable of providing a wide range of grid
services including energy arbitrage, frequency regulation, re-
serve provision, resiliency enhancement, and renewable firm-
ing [2], [3]. In recent years, the battery manufacturing cost
has reduced, which encourages merchant BESSs to participate
in the electricity markets. Since 2018, independent system
operators (ISOs) in the US are required by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 841 to remove barriers
for BESS’s participation in the various markets [4]. This order
further motivates merchant BESSs to offer energy and ancil-
lary services through the wholesale market. It also inspires the
power industry and research community to thoroughly under-
stand the BESS’s operating patterns, revenue streams, and cost
structures in the energy and ancillary services markets.
To study the market operation of merchant BESSs, existing
literature models the merchant BESS as a price-maker in the
market, since these utility-scale BESSs could impact market
This work was supported by the Power Systems Engineering Research
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prices due to their capacity and technical characteristics [5]–
[10]. Using the price-maker modeling approach, it is possible
to study the optimal allocation of merchant BESS across
various markets and analyze the impact of BESS’s profit max-
imization activities on the ISO’s market clearing outcomes.
In line with the works which focus on markets’ design
[11] and operation [12], reference [5] compares three different
market mechanisms for operation scheduling of a BESS in the
energy market. This work is mainly focused on the market
mechanism and does not deal with operational details of BESS
and ancillary services markets. A comprehensive study on the
operation of price-maker BESS in the energy market under
various transmission congestion scenarios is performed in [6].
This work does not model ancillary services markets besides
the energy market and also neglects the battery degradation
cost. Studies on market operations of price-maker BESSs
are enhanced in [7] by considering day-ahead energy and
reserve markets and real-time balancing market. However,
the frequency regulation market, which is one of the major
revenue streams for BESSs in practical applications [2], is not
considered in [7]. In [8], BESS is modeled as a price-taker in
the energy market and price-maker in reserve and frequency
regulation markets using a novel approach for price-maker
modeling. Reference [8] models the most important markets
for the operation of BESS and also considers parameter
uncertainties in the model. However, this work neglects the
battery degradation cost, which may lead to inaccurate results.
To enable comprehensive analysis on the interactions be-
tween merchant BESSs and energy/ancillary services markets,
we propose two optimization frameworks in [9], [10] for the
participation of price-maker BESS in real-time energy, reserve,
and pay as performance frequency regulation markets with (in
[10]) and without (in [9]) an accurate degradation cost model.
In [10], we also develop a market-based dispatch model for
the automatic generation control (AGC) signals, in order to
study the details of BESS operations in the regulation market.
Built upon our frameworks in [9], [10], this paper performs
comparative case studies to investigate the impact of battery
degradation on the operation scheduling and revenue/cost of
a price-maker BESS in real-time energy, reserve, and pay as
performance regulation markets. The frameworks in [9], [10]
enable us to determine the optimal scheduling of a price-maker
BESS is real-time energy and ancillary services markets with978-1-7281-8192-9/21/$31.00 ©2021 IEEE
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and without considering the battery degradation cost in the
decision-making process. Simulation results obtained using
each framework on a synthetic test system are presented in
four different cases, representing various market participation
policies for the BESS. A comparative analysis of the case
study results evaluates the impact of battery degradation on
the BESS’s market operation.
In the remainder of the paper, Section II provides a general
overview of the two optimization frameworks with [10] and
without [9] the degradation cost model. Section III compares
the case study results and discusses the impact of battery
degradation on BESS’s participation in real-time energy, re-
serve, and regulation markets. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. FRAMEWORKS DESCRIPTION
In our previous works [9], [10], we propose two optimiza-
tion frameworks to study the optimal participation of a price-
maker BESS in real-time energy, reserve, and pay as perfor-
mance frequency regulation markets. Both frameworks contain
comprehensive models for BESS operating limits, as well
as details of ISO’s joint market clearing procedure for real-
time energy and ancillary services markets. The framework
in [9] neglects battery degradation costs for simplicity, while
the framework in [10] contains an accurate degradation cost
model.
To study detailed interactions between BESS’s profit maxi-
mization strategies and ISO’s joint market clearing procedure
across real-time energy, reserve, and regulation markets, in
[9], [10], the BESS is modeled as a price-maker using bi-level
optimization frameworks with coupled upper and lower level
problems. In the upper-level problem (ULP), BESS’s owner
maximizes its revenue across various markets within a certain
time period, while the lower-level problem (LLP) simulates the
ISO’s joint market clearing procedure. BESS’s quantity and
price offers for each market at each market clearing interval
serve as decision variables in the ULP and input parameters to
the LLP, while market clearing prices (MCPs) and scheduled
power of BESS serve as decision variables in the LLP and
input parameters to the ULP.
Fig. 1 shows the structure and main components of each
framework with [10] or without [9] considering battery degra-
dation cost. The coupling between ULP and LLP is repre-
sented by terms in blue. Terms in black represent components
that are modeled in both [9] and [10]. Terms in red represent
components that are modeled in [10] only. As shown in Fig.
1, these two frameworks share the same LLP but differ in the
ULP. A general description of the ULPs and the common LLP
for both frameworks is presented below. Detailed equations for
the frameworks with and without modeling battery degradation
cost can be found in [10] and [9], respectively.
A. Upper-level Problem (ULP)
In the ULP, the BESS owner who has several battery
storage units at different buses maximizes its revenue from
the real-time energy, spinning reserve, and pay as performance
frequency regulation markets while considering its operating
BESS’s Quantity
and Price Offers
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Upper-level Problem
BESS maximizes its profit from various markets
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Subject to:
1) Batteries’ Charge/Discharge Limits
2) Batteries’ State of Charge (SOC) Managements
3) Batteries’ Degradation Cost Model
4) AGC Signal Dispatching Model
Lower-level Problem
ISO jointly clears the markets
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Subject to:
1) Operational Limits of the BESS
2) Operational Limits of the Other Participants 
3) Frequency Regulation Market Model
4) System-wide Reliability Requirements
5) Power Balance at each Bus
6) Transmission Network Model
Fig. 1. Structure of the optimization frameworks. T denotes the studied time
period; B denotes the set of all battery units owned by a BESS owner; G
denotes the set of all the other generating units in the market; ∆t denotes the
length of each market clearing interval; REi,t, R
Rs
i,t , R
RgC
i,t , R
RgM
i,t denote
the BESS’s revenue obtained using battery unit i from energy, reserve,
regulation capacity and regulation mileage markets at market clearing interval
t, respectively; DegCosti,t denotes the degradation cost of battery unit i
during market clearing interval t; CB,Ei,t , C
B,Rs
i,t , C
B,RgC
i,t , C
B,RgM
i,t denote
the operating costs of battery unit i in the energy, reserve, regulation capacity
and regulation mileage markets at market clearing interval t, respectively;
CG,Ej,t , C
G,Rs
j,t , C
G,RgC
j,t , C
G,RgM
j,t denote the operating costs of generating
unit j in the energy, reserve, regulation capacity and regulation mileage
markets at market clearing interval t, respectively.
limits, including or not including the battery degradation cost.
The ULP of each framework is described below.
1) Framework without Degradation Cost Model:
In this framework, components of the ULP are represented
by terms in black in Fig. 1. The objective function maximizes
BESS’s total revenue from energy, reserve, regulation capacity,
and regulation mileage markets across a certain time period
and across all the battery units at different buses. Each revenue
term is calculated by multiplying the battery unit’s dispatched
power and corresponding MCP. Revenue from the energy
market can be positive or negative in each market clearing
interval as BESS may sell (i.e., discharge) or buy (i.e., charge)
energy in each interval. Revenue from the reserve market is
paid to each unit for reserving its output for contingency
conditions. Revenue from the regulation market consists of
regulation capacity payment, which is paid based on the
unit’s reserved capacity for regulation services provision; and
regulation mileage payment, which is paid based on the unit’s
contribution toward following system-level AGC signals.
Reserve services deployment is modeled in neither of the
frameworks as it is related to contingency analysis. In this
framework (without degradation cost model), AGC signal
deployment is modeled by assuming that AGC signals have
zero-mean over each market clearing interval. These zero-
mean AGC signals are provided by ISOs like PJM and
ISO New England (ISO-NE) [13]. This assumption indicates
following AGC signals 1) will not change the battery unit’s
state of charge (SOC) across each market clearing interval
while charge/discharge efficiency is ideal; 2) will not cause
additional cost to BESS owners if battery degradation is
neglected. Therefore, a dispatch model for AGC signals is not
needed when battery degradation cost is not considered.
The constraints of the ULP in this framework include:
1) Batteries’ charge/discharge limits: these constraints ensure
the quantity offer of BESS for each market is within the
battery units’ charge/discharge limits. Also, the accumulated
dispatched power for various services in each market clearing
interval should not violate the charge/discharge limits of the
batteries. 2) Batteries’ SOC management: these constraints
keep track of the changes in the battery unit’s SOC in each
market clearing interval, which are resulted from BESS’s
participation in various markets. These constraints also ensure
the SOC lies within its upper/lower limits and force BESS to
have the same SOC at the beginning and end of each day.
2) Framework with Degradation Cost Model:
In Fig. 1, terms in red represent components that are added
to the ULP of the previous framework to build the frame-
work considering battery degradation costs. By subtracting the
degradation cost term from the objective function and adding
a group of constraints for modeling degradation costs, the
battery degradation costs are calculated based on a linear ap-
proximation of the rainflow algorithm [14]. Rainflow algorithm
is an accurate method for battery degradation cost modeling,
which counts the number of charge/discharge cycles in the
battery’s operation period and assigns costs to them based on
the depth of the cycles. It means that having charge/discharge
cycles with lower depth results in less degradation cost.
To obtain degradation cost during BESS’s AGC signal
following activities, each battery unit’s contribution toward
system-level AGC signals needs to be modeled. This is han-
dled by the AGC signal dispatching model in the constraints of
the ULP, where a participation factor is defined to accurately
dispatch system-level AGC signals based on market outcomes.
B. Lower-level Problem (LLP)
As shown in Fig. 1, the LLP models ISOs’ joint market
clearing process, and it is similar in both frameworks. The
LLP objective function minimizes the total operating cost of
real-time energy, reserve, regulation capacity, and regulation
mileage markets across a certain time period, considering the
operating costs of the BESS and other non-battery market
participants. Each cost term is calculated by multiplying each
unit’s price offer to its scheduled power. The BESS’s price
offers are input parameters from the ULP. It is assumed that
BESS can perfectly predict price offers of other participants.
The following six groups of constraints are considered for
the LLP, as shown in Fig. 1. 1) Operational limits of BESS:
these constraints limit each battery unit’s scheduled power
for each market below its corresponding quantity offer. 2)
Operational limits of other participants: minimum and max-
imum generation limits of other participants are maintained
in these constraints along with ramping limits. 3) Frequency
regulation market model: these constraints model the impact
of each unit’s historical performance in regulation services
provision on its current dispatch in the regulation market. 4)
System-wide reliability requirements: these constraints ensure
that, during each market clearing interval, the system ancillary
services requirements are satisfied by the scheduled power
of BESS and other market participants. The corresponding
dual variables are MCPs for reserve, regulation capacity, and
regulation mileage provisions. 5) Power balance at each bus:
these constraints enforce the Kirchhoff’s current law at each
bus. The corresponding dual variables are locational marginal
prices (LMPs) at various buses. 6) Transmission network
model: these constraints calculate transmission line power flow
and enforce line thermal limits.
Using the conversion procedure in [15], both bi-level frame-
works are converted to mixed integer linear programming
(MILP) to be solved using available commercial solvers.
III. CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The above two optimization frameworks enable us to eval-
uate the impact of battery degradation cost on BESS’s opera-
tions in various markets. This section investigates such impact
through four comparative case studies performed on the above
optimization frameworks under different market participation
scenarios of BESS. In [9], [10], several case studies are
performed to evaluate each proposed framework’s performance
separately. This section focuses on understanding how battery
degradation cost could affect BESS’s market participation and
profit maximization activities, through comparing simulation
results obtained using both frameworks.
A. The Test System
To have a synthetic test system built upon real-world data,
the IEEE reliability test system (RTS), updated by Grid
Modernization Laboratory Consortium, i.e., RTS-GLMC, is
adopted for the case studies [16]. The simulations are per-
formed on the third area of the RTS-GMLC network. This
test system consists of 25 buses, 39 transmission lines, 26
generators, and a battery unit on Bus 13. The simulation
horizon is 24 hours with 15-minute market clearing intervals
(i.e., 96 market clearing intervals in total). The AGC signals
are dispatched every 20 seconds for the framework with the
degradation cost model and AGC signal dispatch model.
System load, reserve, and regulation capacity requirements
for the simulation horizon are determined by averaging the
summer (June to August) load and ancillary services require-
ments of the third area in the RTS-GMLC. During the 24-
hour simulation horizon, the system load varies between 1285
MW and 2345 MW. The system peak and valley loads happen
in Hours 11~18 and Hours 1~6, respectively. Hence, it is
TABLE I
OPERATIONAL INFORMATION OF THE BATTERY UNIT
(Dis)charge Storage Min Max Initial (Dis)charge
limit Capacity SOC SOC SOC Efficiency
(MW) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh) (%)
50 200 20 180 90 95
expected that the energy market price reaches its highest and
lowest values in respectively Hours 11~18 and Hours 1~6.
In each market clearing interval, the system’s regulation
mileage requirement is set to be 1.5 times the regulation
capacity requirement. The sample AGC set points, provided
by ISO-NE, are modified for AGC signal modeling [17]. The
modified AGC signals have zero-mean over each 15-minute
market clearing interval. In each market clearing interval, the
total variation of the modified AGC signals is equal to the
corresponding system regulation mileage requirement.
It is assumed, in each market clearing interval, each genera-
tor’s price offer for the energy market is equal to the generation
cost. Generator price offers for reserve, regulation capacity,
and regulation mileage markets are 0.15, 0.4, and 0.07 times
their energy price offers, respectively. The multipliers used
for calculating ancillary services’ price offers are derived
from PJM historical data by averaging over the ratio of each
ancillary service price to the energy price [18].
The BESS owner has a lithium-ion battery unit at Bus 13
with the operational parameters specified in Table I. The useful
life of the battery is 6000 full charge/discharge cycles with
cycle depth of 80%, and the battery replacement cost is 200
k$/MWh price. This information is used for incorporating the
battery degradation cost into the framework with the degrada-
tion cost model. Details on the degradation cost function can
be found in [10].
B. Case 1: Energy Market
This case compares the BESS’s performance with and
without modeling its degradation cost, when the BESS only
participates in the energy market. Figs. 2(A) and 2(B) show the
BESS’s scheduled power (in MW) and SOC (in MWh) when
the BESS participates in the energy market only, without and
with the degradation model, respectively.
Fig. 2(A) shows when degradation costs are neglected,
energy arbitrage between hours is a profitable bidding strategy
for a BESS only participating in the energy market. Hence,
the BESS buys energy (with negative scheduled power) and
charges itself (with an increase in the SOC) during initial
hours with lower energy prices (hours 1~6), in order to sell the
stored energy during hours with higher energy prices (hours
11~18). As shown in Fig. 2(A), BESS uses all its available
capacity for this inter-temporal energy arbitrage. The BESS
also experiences deep charge/discharge cycles for maximizing
its revenue, which, in real-world practices, may result in
considerable battery life loss and degradation cost.
Fig. 2(B) shows when degradation costs are considered in
the BESS’s bidding strategies, the BESS’s participation in the
energy market is very limited. It only buys 12 MWh energy
Fig. 2. Scheduled power and SOC of BESS when it participates in energy
market only, using (A) framework without degradation cost model; (B)
framework with degradation cost model. The black curve denotes BESS’s
scheduled power in energy market; The grey area denotes the BESS’s SOC.
once during off-peak hours (hours 3~4) and sells this amount
of energy once during peak hours (hours 14~16). In this case,
when battery degradation is considered, participating in the
energy market does not generate enough revenue to overcome
the total degradation cost. Therefore, the BESS limits its
participation in the energy market.
C. Case 2: Energy and Reserve Markets
This case compares the BESS’s performance with and with-
out modeling its degradation cost, when the BESS participates
in both energy and reserve markets. Figs. 3(A) and 3(B) show
the BESS’s scheduled power (in MW) and SOC (in MWh)
when the BESS participates in the energy and reserve markets,
without and with the degradation model, respectively.
In Fig. 3(A), the BESS prefers participating in the reserve
market more than the energy market. In most hours, the
BESS’s scheduled power in the reserve market reaches its 50
MW charge/discharge limit. The BESS also performs inter-
temporal energy arbitrage to gain revenue from the energy
market, but the amount of energy arbitrage is limited as the
BESS reaches its charge/discharge limit. BESSs with higher
charge/discharge limits may participate more in the energy
market.
As shown in Fig. 3(B), when the degradation cost is
modeled, the reserve market becomes the only source of
revenue for BESS, and BESS does not participate in the energy
market. In essence, as reserve deployment is not modeled in
this work, participation in the reserve market does not incur
any degradation cost for the BESS. Hence, BESS provides
reserve services as much as it can and does not perform any
energy arbitrage between hours as the revenue generated by
this activity does not overcome the degradation cost in this test
system. In this case, the battery degradation does not have
a significant impact on the BESS’s operation in the reserve
Fig. 3. Scheduled power and SOC of BESS when it participates in energy
and reserve markets, using (A) framework without degradation cost model;
(B) framework with degradation cost model. The solid black and dashed
blue curves denote BESS’s scheduled power in energy and reserve markets,
respectively; The grey area denotes the BESS’s SOC.
market, but this degradation reduces the BESS’s energy market
participation significantly.
D. Case 3: Energy and Frequency Regulation Markets
This case compares the BESS’s performance with and with-
out the degradation cost model, when the BESS participates in
both energy and regulation markets. Figs. 4(A) and 4(B) show
the BESS’s scheduled power (in MW) and SOC (in MWh)
when the BESS participates in the energy and regulation
markets, without and with the degradation model, respectively.
In this case, the simulation results without (Fig. 4(A)) and
with (Fig. 4(B)) the degradation cost model are more similar
to each other than those in the previous cases. Under both
frameworks, the BESS participates the most in the frequency
regulation market. In Fig. 4(A), when battery degradation is
neglected, BESS also participates in the energy market and
performs energy arbitrage when its scheduled power for reg-
ulation capacity provision does not reach its charge/discharge
limit at the beginning and end of the day. A BESS with
a higher charge/discharge limit may participate more in the
energy market. In Fig. 4(B), when battery degradation is
considered, the BESS limits its energy market participation to
only compensating for the energy discharged due to following
AGC signals. Although the AGC signals have zero-mean over
each market clearing interval, the battery’s charge/discharge
efficiency is not 100%. In the framework with models for
the degradation cost and AGC signal dispatch, this fact leads
to a SOC reduction when the BESS follows the AGC sig-
nals. Therefore, BESS needs to compensate for the energy
discharged due to AGC signal following to maintain a similar
SOC at the beginning and end of the day.
The SOC curve of Fig. 4(B) has small fluctuations (on top
of the overall shape) all over the simulation horizon. These
fluctuations are low-depth charge/discharge cycles caused by
following AGC signals. As these low-depth charge/discharge
cycles will result in low degradation costs, the BESS’s regula-
tion market participation will not cause significant degradation
costs. Hence, degradation cost modeling in these simulations
does not affect the operation pattern of BESS in the regulation
market a lot, and this pattern is similar in 4(A) and 4(B).
E. Case 4: Energy, Reserve and Regulation Markets
This case compares the BESS’s performance with and with-
out modeling its degradation cost, when the BESS participates
in all the energy, reserve, and regulation markets. Figs. 3(A)
and 3(B) show the BESS’s scheduled power (in MW) and
SOC (in MWh) when the BESS participates in these markets,
without and with the degradation model, respectively.
Comparison of Fig. 5(A) with Fig. 5(B) shows that similar
to the previous cases, the operation of BESS in ancillary ser-
vices markets does not change a lot by considering degradation
costs in this test system. This happens since 1) the reserve de-
ployment is not modeled; and 2) providing regulation services
does not cause high degradation costs. However, the BESS’s
energy market participation is reduced after considering degra-
dation costs, since doing energy arbitrage in the energy market
is less profitable for BESSs with degradation costs.
F. Comparative Analysis for BESS’s Revenue and Cost
Fig. 6 shows the BESS’s total revenue from each market
and its degradation cost in Cases 1~4, using frameworks with
and without the degradation cost model.
Comparison of Bar A with Bar B for each case in Fig. 6
validates our previous observations for this synthetic test case
system build upon real-world data. First, considering batteries’
degradation cost in BESS operation scheduling significantly
Fig. 4. Scheduled power and SOC of BESS when it participates in energy
and regulation markets, using (A) framework without degradation cost model;
(B) framework with degradation cost model. The black, green, and red curves
denote BESS’s scheduled power in energy, regulation capacity, and regulation
mileage markets, respectively; The grey area denotes the BESS’s SOC.
Fig. 5. Scheduled power and SOC of BESS when it participates in energy,
reserve, and regulation markets, using (A) framework without degradation cost
model; (B) framework with degradation cost model. The black, blue, green,
and red curves denote BESS’s scheduled power in energy, reserve, regulation
capacity, and regulation mileage markets, respectively; The grey area denotes
the BESS’s SOC.
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Fig. 6. BESS’s total revenue from each market and its degradation cost
in Cases 1~4, using (A) framework without degradation cost model; (B)
framework with degradation cost model.
reduces BESS’s participation and revenue in the energy mar-
ket. Second, BESS’s participation and revenue in reserve and
regulation markets do not change significantly by modeling
degradation costs. However, modeling reserve deployment in
the studies may affect the results for the reserve market.
Fig. 4(B) and Fig. 5(B) show the degradation costs in
Cases 3~4 are mostly associated with the BESS’s regulation
market participation and AGC signal following. Fig. 6 shows
the total degradation costs in Cases 3~4 are around 1% of
the BESS’s revenue from the regulation market, which is
negligible in comparison to the revenue. Therefore, neglecting
the degradation costs caused by AGC signal following should
not have a considerable impact on the results. This neglection
could significantly reduce the optimization complexity and
computation time. It could be adopted in future work when
other BESS/market operational details need to be considered.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on our previously proposed frameworks for the
participation of a price-maker BESS in real-time energy,
reserve, and pay as performance frequency regulation markets
with and without battery degradation cost model, this paper
conducts comparative case studies to investigate the impact of
battery degradation on BESS’s revenue, cost, and operations in
energy and ancillary services markets. Simulation results using
synthetic test system build upon real-world data shows that 1)
considering degradation cost may significantly reduce BESS’s
energy market participation; 2) the BESS’s participation pat-
tern in the reserve and regulation markets is not significantly
impacted by the battery degradation cost.
Future work can be focused on considering parameter
uncertainties, studying other ancillary services markets, and
modeling renewable resources in the frameworks.
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